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affords children access to donor-identifying information1 upon
their eighteenth birthday while maintaining anonymity as a viable
option for the donor. I do not aim to speak for all children
conceived through the use of donated sperm; my opinions are
distinctly my own. I do, however, wish to present a credible
overview of the United States’ approach to the regulation of
donated sperm, discuss possible improvements to this paradigm,
and highlight how anonymous sperm donation plays a crucial role
in protecting gay and lesbian families.
I never had the desire to “know” my sperm donor. Unlike
many children conceived using donated sperm,2 I do not view my
donor’s identity as fundamental to my own. My lack of desire for a
relationship with my donor does not mean, however, that I was not
curious about his life and his decision to donate sperm. As a young
girl, I remember asking my mothers to describe the process by
which they “chose” my donor. I learned that they picked him from
a book provided by the sperm bank—a menu of choices offering a
glimpse of the child they would conceive. I requested from my
parents a description of his physical characteristics and learned his
hair color (brown), his height (approximately five feet nine
inches), and the color of his eyes (green). I was particularly
surprised to learn that at the time he donated sperm, he was
employed as a professional dancer. Learning of this fact as a girl
with no interest in dance revealed the vast differences between our
identities. It made me view my donor as the mere vehicle by which
I was born, rather than as my father. The secrecy of my donor’s
identity and being unable to transpose his known physical
characteristics to a familiar face reinforced my view that he was not
my parent. This outlook, largely aided by anonymity, diminished
any desire I may have had for a relationship with him.
Anonymous donation policies have become the subject of
heated debate in recent years, and some donor-conceived
individuals have begun to argue for a “re-examination of the
1 By “donor-identifying information,” I am referring to information regarding
genetic heritage, occupation, and geographic location. I am not referring to
information that would give children access to the donor’s telephone number, email
address, or home address unless the donor expressly consents to the sharing of this
information at the time of the donation.
2 Judith Graham, Sperm Donors’ Offspring Reach Out into Past, CHI. TRIB. (June 19,
2005), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2005-06-19/news/0506190276_1_sperm-
donor-sperm-bank-dna-sample [https://perma.cc/B7F8-6JB8] (describing how many
donor-conceived children seek donor-identifying information to obtain a more
complete sense of identity).
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anonymity that cloaks many donors,”3 criticizing the United States’
sperm donation model as perpetuating a system in which sperm
banks are not held accountable for negligent donation policies.
Highlighting this debate, The New York Times published an article in
2011 describing a man who had fathered 150 offspring by selling
his sperm to a United States sperm bank.4 The article describes the
Donor Sibling Registry5—a website that connects donor-conceived
individuals with their biological siblings—and it argues that
anonymity often perpetuates circumstances in which a single
donor’s sperm is used to conceive a large number of offspring.6 It
also describes a growing anxiety among certain parents and their
donor-conceived children about “potential negative consequences
of having so many children fathered by the same donors, including
the possibility that genes for rare diseases could be spread more
widely through the population.”7
In contrast to the view that anonymity shields sperm banks
from accountability for negligent donation practices, this article
argues that anonymous sperm donation is crucial to protect
atypical family structures and the relationships within them. To
support this argument, I explore different approaches to the
sperm donation industry within the United States and Canada.
Ultimately, I argue that Washington State’s recently enacted
insemination law,8 which balances donor privacy with a child’s
ability to seek basic donor-identifying information upon his or her
eighteenth birthday, provides a model which other sperm
donation policies should follow. As explained in the following
sections of this article, anonymity is crucial to promote important
pecuniary and privacy interests of the donor, and to protect the
legal rights of families who rely on donated sperm to conceive a
child. Anonymous donation must be preserved as a viable
reproductive option in the United States, but a child should be
able to pierce the veil of anonymity upon his or her eighteenth
birthday if the donor has not expressly requested absolute
anonymity at the time of donation.
Part I of this article describes regulated sperm donation as an
3 Jacqueline Mroz, One Sperm Donor, 150 Offspring, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/06/health/06donor.html.
4 Id.
5 THE DONOR SIBLING REGISTRY, https://www.donorsiblingregistry.com [https://
perma.cc/3728-SRL4].
6 Mroz, supra note 3.
7 Id.
8 WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.750 (2016).
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economic contract in which anonymity plays a prominent role. It
also explains that anonymous donation fosters crucial policy
interests, promotes the ability of atypical family structures to
produce offspring, and protects the legal rights of these families.
Part II discusses the obstacles that opponents of anonymous sperm
donation may face when attempting to enjoin anonymity polices
through constitutional litigation. Part III explores the Canadian
model of regulated sperm donation and describes recent
developments in case law weakening donor anonymity. Part IV
describes Washington State’s legislation regarding sperm donation
and argues that Washington’s model adequately balances donor
anonymity with a child’s autonomy. The article concludes that
sperm banks should provide offspring with basic donor-identifying
information upon their eighteenth birthday. This approach would
appropriately balance the child’s desire for information with the
donor’s right to privacy.
I. AMERICAN SPERM DONATION: AN ECONOMIC TRANSACTION
The United States’ sperm donation industry is a multi-billion-
dollar business, and each year approximately 30,000 to 60,000 chil-
dren in the United States are conceived using donated sperm.9
The total number of U.S. sperm banks providing anonymous do-
nor samples remains a mystery,10 as sperm banks are largely free-
market entities divorced from federal or state regulation.11 While
the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) mandates specific re-
cord-keeping guidelines for sperm banks, the guidelines do not
limit the number of children conceived through the use of a partic-
ular donor’s sperm, and they are silent on the issue of donor ano-
nymity.12 In fact, the FDA permits sperm banks to dispose of
donation records after ten years.13 In the absence of specific guide-
lines, United States sperm banks are free to maximize their donors’
9 Naomi Cahn, Old Lessons for a New World: Applying Adoption Research and Experi-
ence to ART, 24 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 1, 5 (2011). The fact that this estimate
spans a broad range reflects the reality that many sperm banks in the United States
are unregulated entities. This lack of regulation makes it difficult to know exactly how
many children are born through anonymous sperm donation each year.
10 See John K. Critser, Current Status of Semen Banking in the USA, 13 OXFORD J. HUM.
REPROD. suppl. 2, 1998, at 55.
11 See Amy Harmon, Hello, I’m Your Sister. Our Father Is Donor 150, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
20, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/20/us/hello-im-your-sister-our-father-
is-donor-150.html.
12 21 C.F.R. § 1271.270 (2016).
13 Id.
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output, resulting in large numbers of children conceived from a
single donor’s sperm.
Many of those born through anonymous sperm donation do
not have the opportunity to seek donor-identifying information.14
The paradigmatic approach to regulated sperm donation in the
United States favors sealing donor information unless the donor
expressly consents to its release at the time of the donation.15 Some
sperm banks require mutual consent between an adult donor-con-
ceived individual and the donor before the sperm bank will release
donor-identifying information.16 Even if both parties consent to a
release of identifying information upon the child’s eighteenth
birthday, a sperm bank might not provide a donor’s information
until the donor provides updated information to the bank, and if
the donor cannot be found, the bank will not release his informa-
tion.17 This approach might leave some donor-conceived individu-
als without access to basic donor-identifying information, even
when the donor originally consented to its release.
Although many donor-conceived individuals face difficulties
when attempting to access donor information directly from the
sperm bank that provided the gamete, the Donor Sibling Registry
is a database that allows them to locate information about their
genetic roots18 by providing the opportunity to connect with bio-
logical siblings.19 Upon donating, each donor receives a unique
identifying number, which the sperm bank shares with its prospec-
tive parent customers.20 Once equipped with this number, one can
use the Donor Sibling Registry to connect with others conceived by
14 See generally Brigitte Clark, A Balancing Act? The Rights of Donor-Conceived Children
to Know Their Biological Origins, 40 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 619 (2012).
15 See id. at 639; cf. Vanessa L. Pi, Regulating Sperm Donation: Why Requiring Exposed
Donation Is Not the Answer, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 379, 379 (2009) (“[M]ost
sperm is donated anonymously in one of the two dozen commercial sperm banks in
this country.”).
16 See, e.g., Anonymous Donor Contact Policy, CAL. CRYOBANK, http://
www.cryobank.com/Services/Post-Conception-Services/Anonymous-Donor-Contact-
Policy/ [https://perma.cc/8J24-MAYA] (“While we are NOT opposed in principal to
breaking anonymity between the donor and the adult child, it must be by mutual
consent of both parties.”).
17 See R. Hertz et al., Sperm Donors Describe the Experience of Contact with Their Donor-
Conceived Offspring, 2 FACTS, VIEWS & VISION OBGYN, no. 2, 2015, at 92, http://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4498174/.
18 See Our History and Mission, THE DONOR SIBLING REGISTRY, https://
www.donorsiblingregistry.com/about-dsr/history-and-mission [https://perma.cc/
HU5F-GPSP].
19 Id.
20  JAMES M. GOLDFARB, THIRD-PARTY REPRODUCTION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 162
(2014).
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the same donor. As people conceived through anonymous dona-
tion are becoming increasingly aware of the large number of half-
siblings born from the same donor, many are calling for a re-exam-
ination of sperm bank anonymity policies.21
While there is a “growing body of research, largely conducted
in the adoption field, [which] supports the argument that knowl-
edge of one’s genetic background is crucial to the development of
a sense of identity or self,”22 maintaining anonymity in the dona-
tion system is crucial to ensuring an adequate supply of sperm for
atypical families.23
A. Anonymity Promotes Donation by Reducing Donor Anxiety About
Future Contact.
The virtues of anonymous donation cannot be ignored. Anon-
ymous donation dismantles the donor’s status as a “father” and re-
inforces sperm donation as a formal economic contract meeting
the pecuniary interests of the donor24 and the social interests of
the legal parents. Within this contract, anonymity is an essential
component of the consideration that the sperm bank provides to
the donor in exchange for his sperm. Treating sperm donation as
an economic contract promotes donation by allowing men to do-
nate for purely pecuniary reasons,25 while remaining free from the
obligations that accompany parenthood. Framing sperm donation
as an economic transaction reinforces the view that the donor is
not the legal parent of the child, and it provides incentives for men
to donate sperm.
Anonymity also ensures an adequate supply of sperm by pro-
21 See Mroz, supra note 3.
22 Clark, supra note 14, at 621. Even in states such as New York, which mandates
that sperm banks supply nonidentifying information about donors to facilities that
perform assisted reproductive services, “[t]here is no mechanism in the regulations
for offspring resulting from gamete and embryo donation to gain access to donor
information directly.” See Executive Summary of Assisted Reproductive Technologies: Analysis
and Recommendations for Public Policy, N.Y. DEP’T OF HEALTH, https://
www.health.ny.gov/regulations/task_force/reports_publications/execsum.htm
[https://perma.cc/SWV7-MRHK].
23 See Pi, supra note 15, at 395.
24 Ken R. Daniels et al., Semen Donor Recruitment: A Study of Donors in Two Clinics, 11
OXFORD J. HUM. REPROD., no. 4, 1996, at 747-48 (explaining that a majority of donors
choose to donate for economic reasons).
25 I am not suggesting that all men donate sperm solely for the purpose of pay-
ment. Certainly, many men donate sperm for altruistic and personal reasons. See Al-
lison Brown, Money Shots: College Students Profit, Help Infertile Couples by Donating Sperm
and Eggs, DAILY FREE PRESS, https://www.cryobank.com/uploadedFiles/Cry-
obankcom/_forms/pdf/news/DailyFreePressJan04.pdf [https://perma.cc/8EVQ-
LF77].
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tecting donors from moral opposition to sperm donation.26 In the
1960s myriad state courts held that insemination using donated
sperm was adultery on the part of the mother, and children con-
ceived through the process were considered illegitimate.27 These
precedents painted sperm donation as an illegitimate means by
which to conceive a child, and they shrouded the use of sperm
donation in secrecy. In 1973, however, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (now known as the Uni-
form Law Commission) addressed sperm donation for the first
time in the Uniform Parentage Act (“UPA”). The UPA provided
that “[t]he donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use
in the insemination of a married woman other than the donor’s
wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child
thereby conceived.”28 The UPA helped to promote the legitimacy
of sperm donation by codifying this approach in the states that
adopted its language, thereby providing a legal means to create a
family, albeit in very limited circumstances.
While the adoption of the UPA helped to legitimize donor in-
semination as a valid means to conceive a child, some donors still
experience anxiety about offspring seeking a relationship with
them.29 This anxiety might discourage some donors from donating
sperm if anonymity did not remain a viable option.30
A man may be more likely to donate sperm when he is able to
keep his choice hidden from the broader community. For exam-
ple, the recent decrease in the supply of Britain’s donated sperm
correlates to a ban on anonymously donated sperm.31 In 2005, Brit-
ain passed a law allowing donor-conceived individuals access to do-
nor-identifying information upon their eighteenth birthday.32 In
2006, merely a year after the law was passed, only 307 people regis-
26 See Pi, supra note 15, at 395.
27 Thomas K. Sylvester, The Case Against Sperm Donor Anonymity 4-5 (2007) (un-
published J.D. thesis, Yale Law School), https://www.donorsiblingregistry.com/sites/
default/files/images/docs/legal.pdf [https://perma.cc/XSM6-YNG8].
28 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973).
29 See Vasanti Jadva et al., Sperm and Oocyte Donors’ Experiences of Anonymous Donation
and Subsequent Contact with Their Donor Offspring, 26 OXFORD J. HUM. REPROD., no. 3,
2011, at 641-42.
30 See generally Chris Whitman, I Fathered 34 Children Through Sperm Donation,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2014/jan/31/
fathered-34-children-sperm-donation [https://perma.cc/YA32-WURZ].
31 See Denise Grady, Shortage of Sperm Donors in Britain Prompts Calls for Change, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 11, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/12/health/12sperm.html.
32 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (Disclosure of Donor Informa-
tion) Regulations 2004, SI 2004/1511 (Eng.), http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/
ELC_Annex_B_Sept04.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DB3-KESD].
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tered to donate sperm even though Britain requires at least 500
donors to provide sperm for approximately 4,000 women.33
These statistics do not establish a direct causal link between
donor anonymity and the supply of donated sperm; however, ob-
servations from doctors at the London Women’s Clinic suggest a
strong correlation. Dr. Kamal Ahuja, director of the London Wo-
men’s Clinic, revealed that prior to 2005, approximately five to ten
men would become donors for every hundred men contacted.34
After the law’s passage, that number dropped to fewer than five
donors for every hundred men contacted.35 The clinic had previ-
ously provided sperm to over sixty in vitro fertilization clinics each
year but stopped in 2005 because it could “no longer spare the
specimens.”36
The decline in the number of men donating sperm in Britain
may be linked to donor fears regarding a child’s ability to contact
them in the future.37 While a donor might choose to donate sperm
for altruistic reasons as well as pecuniary reasons, the donor might
still have a legitimate desire to foreclose future contact with the
person conceived with his sperm. If a sperm bank could no longer
ensure anonymity, the donor might be less likely to donate sperm
for fear that offspring might desire a relationship with him.38
B. Anonymous Donation Prevents Donors from Obtaining Standing to
Assert Parental Rights.
Anonymity prevents donors from being considered the legal
parent of a child conceived through the use of their donated
sperm, even where artificial insemination statutes do not. For ex-
ample, New York State’s insemination statute39 explicitly ensures
that heterosexual, married couples have exclusive parental rights
over children conceived with donated sperm if the insemination is
performed by a licensed physician. Section 73 of the Domestic Re-
lations Law (“DRL”), enacted July 21, 2008, states: “Any child born
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 See, e.g., Whitman, supra note 30 (describing how the author received a negative
reaction from his girlfriend when he shared with her that he had donated sperm).
38 See Linda Villarosa, Once Invisible Sperm Donors Get to Meet the Family, N.Y. TIMES
(May 21, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/21/health/once-invisible-sperm-
donors-get-to-meet-the-family.html (describing the shock that Bob, a donor, exper-
ienced when contacted by his biological offspring and explaining that the “experi-
ence was so overwhelming that he is not sure he will do it again”).
39 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 2016).
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to a married woman by means of artificial insemination performed
by persons duly authorized to practice medicine and with the con-
sent in writing of the woman and her husband, shall be deemed
the legitimate, birth child of the husband and his wife for all pur-
poses.”40 This statute abrogates the donor’s parental rights in cases
where a child is born to a woman legally married to a man by pro-
viding that the husband is the legal parent of the child when the
insemination is performed by an individual duly authorized to
practice medicine and when the mother gives written consent.
DRL section 73, however, fails to protect atypical families and
their children. The statute is silent with regard to the sperm do-
nor’s status when the child is born to a non-married woman, or to a
woman married to another woman, or where the insemination was
performed by a person other than a licensed physician. The stat-
ute’s failure to expressly acknowledge these alternate scenarios ele-
vates the rights of the sperm donor and exposes such families to
legal parentage claims by the donor. In Thomas S. v. Robin Y., New
York’s First Department Appellate Division held that a sperm do-
nor—who had provided sperm to two women in a committed les-
bian relationship, was known to the child, and had spent time with
the child—was a legal father with standing to seek visitation and an
order of filiation.41 Thomas S. illustrates that courts are willing to
recognize sperm donors as legal parents when a child knows the
donor and has spent time with the donor. Based on this reasoning,
the best way for atypical families to protect themselves from intru-
sive donors is to maintain anonymity.
More recently, in 2014 Judge Joan Kohout of the Family Court
of Monroe County effectively held that New York’s insemination
statute does not extend to a married same-sex couple when the
biological father is known to the child. Explaining that the DRL
section 73 marital presumption of legitimacy does not bar a biolog-
ical father (who had limited contact with the child) from filing a
paternity petition against same-sex parents who conceived through
the use of his sperm,42 Judge Kohout reasoned that the marital pre-
sumption of DRL section 73 was meant to “protect[ ] the legiti-
macy of the child and assur[e] that the child had both a father and
mother.”43 She explained that under section 73 “there is no legal
father” when same-sex female spouses use an anonymous sperm do-
40 Id.
41 Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 209 A.D.2d 298, 305-08 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1994).
42 Q.M. v. B.C., 46 Misc. 3d 594, 601-02. (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2014).
43 Id. at 598.
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nor to conceive.44 However, when same-sex spouses use a known
sperm donor, the presumption of legitimacy would “effectively ex-
tinguish” the child’s “right to have a father.”45 Judge Kohout’s deci-
sion highlights the important legal role that anonymity plays in the
sperm donation process for same-sex parents: it effectively bars a
donor’s standing to seek parental rights. This decision reveals that
banning anonymous donation would allow donors to pursue legal
parentage claims and subordinate the rights of non-biological
mothers in same-sex relationships.
C. Anonymity Is Crucial to Promote Relationships Within Atypical
Family Structures.
In addition to serving a donor’s altruistic and pecuniary inter-
ests, anonymity is necessary to support atypical family structures
and to foster the relationships within them. Atypical family struc-
tures—such as lesbian parents, single mothers, or even heterosex-
ual couples who cannot conceive without the assistance of
reproductive technologies—often rely on alternative methods of
reproduction to create a family, and many children conceived us-
ing donated sperm are born into these families.46 Banning anony-
mous sperm donation in the United States likely would diminish
the number of men willing to donate—as it seems to have done in
Britain—and thereby harm atypical families hoping to conceive.
Anonymity also plays an important role in fostering relation-
ships within atypical family structures by elevating the role of the
non-biological parent while minimizing the role of the sperm do-
nor. Couples who cannot conceive together have to make a con-
scious decision to become parents. For example, two women who
seek “to create and co-parent a child could not do so accidentally
or spontaneously. Instead, it would require a series of decisions
and intentional actions.”47 A non-biological mother who adopted
her partner’s donor-conceived child might feel that her role as a
parent is illusory if the child is able to locate his or her biological
father, despite the conscious efforts of the non-biological parent to
become a mother. In this sense, anonymity is critical to promoting
the legitimacy of the non-biological mother’s parental status by dis-
44 Id. at 599.
45 Id.
46 See Sheila M. O’Rourke, Family Law in a Brave New World: Private Ordering of Pa-
rental Rights and Responsibilities for Donor Insemination, 1 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST.
140, 141 (2013).
47 Yehezkel Margalit et al., The New Frontier of Advanced Reproductive Technology:
Reevaluating Modern Legal Parenthood, 37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 107, 137 (2014).
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tancing the sperm donor, and thus minimizing the chances that
the child will view the donor as a father.
Those who oppose anonymously donated sperm must think
critically about alternative avenues to encourage donation for fami-
lies who cannot conceive absent the assistance of reproductive
technologies. To ensure an adequate supply of sperm for these
families, and to ensure that their rights are protected beyond con-
ception, anonymity must remain a viable option.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO ANONYMOUSLY DONATED
SPERM: A CHILD’S FUNDAMENTAL “RIGHT TO KNOW”
DONOR-IDENTIFYING INFORMATION
Opponents of anonymous donation often ground their argu-
ments in constitutional jurisprudence. However, constitutional law
will fail to advance the interests of donor-conceived people. Instead
of relying on the courts, advocates should use the media to en-
courage reformation of donation policies.
Many people conceived through the use of donated sperm ar-
gue that they have a fundamental constitutional right to know their
genetic heritage through access to donor-identifying informa-
tion.48 However, challenging anonymous insemination policies
through constitutional jurisprudence likely will fail for three rea-
sons: (1) sperm banks cannot be considered state actors and thus
are immune from constitutional scrutiny; (2) a plaintiff likely
would be unable to establish standing to bring a constitutional
claim; and (3) the Supreme Court is unlikely to recognize a sub-
stantive due process right to donor-identifying information for chil-
dren conceived through artificial insemination.
A. State Action Doctrine as an Impediment to Constitutional
Challenges by Donor-Conceived Children
Children conceived through artificial insemination likely can-
not establish that sperm banks are state actors for purposes of en-
joining anonymity policies using constitutional law. The relevant
portions of the Constitution on which the opponents of donor ano-
nymity would rely limit only the actions of state and government
officials and do not limit the actions of private entities.49 This “state
48 See, e.g., Jennifer Ludden, Donor-Conceived Children Seek Missing Identities, NPR
(Sept. 18, 2011, 4:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/2011/09/18/140477014/donor-con-
ceived-children-seek-missing-identities.
49 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of the United States; nor shall any state
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action” doctrine effectively immunizes private actors from constitu-
tional scrutiny.50 An action performed by a private individual or
entity is generally subject to constitutional review only if (1) the
challenged act resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege
having its source in state authority; and (2) the private party
charged with the constitutional deprivation can be fairly character-
ized as a state actor.51
When determining whether the challenged act resulted from
the exercise of a right having its source in state authority, the Su-
preme Court has asked whether the state provided the means that
caused the deprivation of a constitutional right.52 For example, in
Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., the Court held that the right to peremp-
tory challenges had its source in state authority because such chal-
lenges derived from federal statutes and case law.53 Similarly, in
Shelley v. Kraemer, the Court held that judicial enforcement of a ra-
cially restrictive covenant had its source in state authority because
the judiciary derives its authority to adjudicate private contractual
matters between parties from state and federal law.54
Actions that take place in an intimate relationship, within the
home, or between private individuals divorced from governmental
regulation are generally considered private actions that do not
have their source in state authority. Fewer than half of the states in
the United States have enacted regulatory legislation regarding
sperm banks, leaving a majority of states without a statute expressly
granting sperm banks the authority to provide donated sperm.55
Moreover, the amended 2002 UPA does not address the authority
of sperm banks to enact anonymous donation policies, and instead
merely provides guidelines for determining whether a donor is a
legal parent in certain cases.56 In fact, statutory research suggests
that Washington State is the only state that has enacted a law re-
quiring full disclosure of donor information upon the child’s eight-
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”) (emphasis
added).
50 See generally Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
51 Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
52 Id.
53 Id. at 941-42.
54 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19-22 (1948).
55 See Pi, supra note 15, at 384 (“Only twenty-four states have created regulatory
legislation addressing the operations of sperm banks.”); see also Christina M. Eastman,
Statutory Regulation of Legal Parentage in Cases of Artificial Insemination by Donor: A New
Frontier of Gender Discrimination, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 371, 380 (2010) (explaining
that only seven states have adopted the exact language of the 2002 amended UPA).
56 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (amended 2002).
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eenth birthday.57 Thus, the majority of sperm banks in the United
States are unregulated and do not derive their right to provide
anonymously donated sperm from statute or governmental
authority.
A sperm bank’s acceptance of anonymously donated sperm
also fails the second “state action” prong because the bank cannot
“in all fairness” be considered a state actor. In this part of the analy-
sis, a court assesses the extent to which the state or federal govern-
ment is entrenched within the private entity’s actions. A court will
look to whether the private party relies upon state governmental
assistance and benefits, whether the party is performing an exclu-
sive governmental function, and whether the alleged injury was ag-
gravated in a unique way by incidents of governmental authority.58
A private party that receives government funding and is inti-
mately entangled with the state or federal government can be con-
sidered a state actor. In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, the
Supreme Court held that a private restaurant was sufficiently en-
tangled with the State of Delaware so as to be considered a state
actor and subject to constitutional scrutiny.59 The restaurant was
located on land owned by the City of Wilmington, and the owner
utilized a publicly-owned parking garage for his patrons.60 The
Court noted that the “peculiar relationship” between the restau-
rant and the city-owned parking facility provided each entity with
“mutual benefits” that sufficiently entrenched the City of Wilming-
ton within the actions of the private restaurant.61
Unlike the parking garage in Burton, United States sperm
banks are largely divorced from governmental regulations and do
not receive significant state and federal funding.62 The FDA does
mandate specific recordkeeping guidelines for sperm banks but
many United States sperm banks are for-profit companies that do
not receive state or federal funds.63 Thus, sperm banks in the
57 See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.750 (2016).
58 See generally Wilson R. Huhn, The State Action Doctrine and the Principle of Democratic
Choice, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1379, 1389-90 (2006).
59 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961).
60 Id. at 719.
61 Id. at 724.
62 See Critser, supra note 10, at 55.
63 See generally Rene Almeling, The Unregulated Sperm Industry, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/01/opinion/sunday/the-unregulated-
sperm-industry.html; see also Why Choose TSBC Above Other Sperm Banks?, THE SPERM
BANK OF CALIFORNIA, http://donors.thespermbankofca.org/why-choose-tsbc (explain-
ing that TSBC is the only non-profit sperm bank in the United States).
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United States cannot be considered sufficiently entrenched in state
and federal government to be considered state actors.
Finally, sperm banks do not perform a function traditionally
reserved to state and federal governments. The Supreme Court has
recognized certain political and community establishment rights as
traditional governmental functions, including the regulation of po-
litical primaries64 and the ability to establish local communities.65
However, a person’s ability to reproduce derives from private and
individual choices existing outside of governmental purview. In Ei-
senstadt v. Baird, the Supreme Court recognized that “[i]f the right
of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual . . . to be
free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fun-
damentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child.”66 Assisted reproduction facilitated by a sperm bank
cannot be considered a traditional governmental function because
the Supreme Court has expressly recognized the decision to
reproduce as a private choice that transcends governmental
influence.
Moreover, the injury caused to children conceived through ar-
tificial donation—an inability to know their genetic heritage—is
not aggravated in a unique way by incidents of governmental au-
thority. Unlike in Shelley v. Kraemer, where the Court held that en-
forcement of a racially restrictive covenant would violate the
Constitution because of the judiciary’s involvement in the enforce-
ment process,67 no branch of government is involved in enforcing
the anonymity policies of sperm banks located in the United States.
The government is simply not entrenched enough in sperm
bank policies and regulations to meet the state action threshold for
constitutional scrutiny. Therefore, the state action doctrine effec-
tively immunizes sperm banks from constitutional suits.
B. Standing Doctrine as an Impediment to Constitutional Challenges
by Donor-Conceived Children
Even if donor-conceived children could overcome the state ac-
tion barrier, they likely could not establish standing to bring a fed-
eral constitutional claim to enjoin sperm bank anonymity policies.
Standing doctrine, grounded in the Article III limitation that fed-
64 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
65 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
66 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
67 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
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eral courts adjudicate only actual cases and controversies,68 re-
quires a plaintiff to assert a concrete injury that is fairly traceable to
the challenged state action and likely to be redressed by the re-
quested relief.69
The inability to access donor-identifying information—such as
current contact information, medical history, and physical charac-
teristics—certainly would be considered a concrete injury for
standing purposes.70 However, a plaintiff challenging sperm bank
anonymity policies likely would be unable to establish the requisite
causation requirement necessary to show standing because the
causal link is too attenuated.71 In Allen v. Wright, the Court denied
standing to a class of plaintiffs suing the Internal Revenue Service
(“IRS”) for granting tax-exempt status to racially segregated private
schools, alleging that the IRS’s actions endorsed racial segregation
in such schools.72 The Court noted that the causal link between the
IRS’s conduct and the desegregation of schools was “attenuated at
best” and the plaintiffs had not established that a “withdrawal of a
tax exemption from any particular school would lead the school to
change its policies.”73 The Court further noted that it was “specula-
tive whether any given parent of a child attending such a private
school would decide to transfer the child to public school as a re-
sult of any changes in educational or financial policy made by the
private school once it was threatened with loss of tax-exempt sta-
tus.”74 While I do not endorse the outcome in this particular deci-
sion, its reasoning reveals that the actions of third parties that
contribute to the plaintiff’s injury may attenuate the causal chain
to the point that standing is unavailable to the plaintiffs.
Using this same reasoning, a donor-conceived individual likely
would not be able to establish that sperm bank anonymity policies
directly cause the injury of being unable to obtain donor-identify-
ing information because the donors themselves are third parties
that attenuate the causal chain. In many sperm bank policies, the
onus is on the donor to inform the banks of updated contact infor-
68 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984).
69 Id. at 751.
70 See generally In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751 (Ill. 1981) (holding that adoptees do
not have a fundamental right to examine their adoption records and implying,
through the court’s adjudication on the merits, that the plaintiffs had standing).
71 See Allen, 468 U.S. at 739 (finding that respondents lacked standing to challenge
the IRS’s implementation of its tax-exemption policies because, inter alia, causation
was too attenuated).
72 Id. at 744-45.
73 Id. at 757-58.
74 Id. at 758.
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mation, employment status, and medical information.75 Even if a
sperm bank allowed donor-conceived individuals to access donor-
identifying information, it is speculative to assume either that the
donor has properly informed the sperm bank of updated contact
and personal information, or that the child would be able to locate
the donor based on identifying information the donor provided
eighteen years prior. Thus, the donor’s responsibility to inform
sperm banks of updated identifying information erodes the causal
link between the bank’s anonymity policy and the plaintiff’s as-
serted harm of being unable to obtain donor-identifying informa-
tion. This attenuation of the causal link makes it unlikely that
opponents of anonymity polices could demonstrate standing to
seek constitutional review of such policies.
C. Due Process Arguments as an Impediment to Constitutional
Challenges by Donor-Conceived Children
In addition to state action and standing hurdles, plaintiffs
likely would be unable to challenge anonymous sperm donation
policies under substantive due process jurisprudence. The Su-
preme Court has articulated that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects fundamental rights that are
deeply rooted in this nation’s history and tradition and “implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty” so that “neither liberty nor justice
would exist if they were sacrificed,” even when such rights are not
expressly enumerated in the text of the Constitution.76 The Su-
preme Court applies strict scrutiny to state action that intrudes
upon fundamental rights and requires a compelling state interest
and narrowly tailored means for such action to pass constitutional
muster.77
The Supreme Court has never deemed a right to know one’s
genetic heritage to be fundamental.78 In Alma Society v. Mellon, a
plaintiff class of adopted individuals filed suit to enjoin a New York
statute that required the sealing of adoption records absent a show-
ing of good cause for release.79 The Second Circuit rejected the
75 See generally Mark Ballantyne, Comment, My Daddy’s Name Is Donor: Evaluating
Sperm Donation Anonymity and Regulation, 15 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 569 (2012).
76 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (citing Palko v. Connecti-
cut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
77 Id.
78 Alma Soc’y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1231-32 (2d Cir. 1979); see Kathryn J.
Giddings, The Current Status of the Right of Adult Adoptees to Know the Identity of Their
Natural Parents, 58 WASH. U. L. REV. 677, 696-97 (1980).
79 Alma Soc’y, 601 F.2d at 1227.
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plaintiffs’ argument that the statute violated the Due Process
Clause by infringing upon a right to learn the identity of one’s ge-
netic heritage, instead upholding it as legitimate to foster relation-
ships between the adoptee and the adopted family and rationally
related to achieve that goal.80 In its holding, the Second Circuit
essentially viewed anonymity as a tool crucial to fostering a relation-
ship between the intentional adoptive parents and the child.81 The
court also valued the relationship between the adoptive parents
and the child over the child’s alleged right to seek information
about genetic heritage.82 The Supreme Court denied certiorari to
review the Second Circuit’s holding in 1979.83 Two years later, the
Illinois Supreme Court similarly held that the ability to seek infor-
mation about one’s genetic heritage was not a fundamental right
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.84 Because the Supreme Court denied certiorari to review
both the decisions of the Second Circuit and the Illinois Supreme
Court and has never formally ruled on the subject, it is unlikely
that the Court will ever be willing to recognize a right to know
donor-identifying information as fundamental under substantive
due process jurisprudence.
By contrast, the Supreme Court has deemed fundamental the
right of parents to the “care, custody, and control” of their chil-
dren,85 which includes the right of fit parents to make decisions for
their children without government interference. The Court would
likely hold that permitting minor children to receive donor-identi-
fying information without their parents’ consent infringes upon a
parent’s fundamental decision-making rights, because when a non-
fundamental right conflicts with a fundamental right, the funda-
mental right prevails. For example, in Troxel v. Granville, the Court
struck down section 26.10.160(3) of the Washington Revised Code,
which provided authority for “any person” to petition for visitation
80 Id. at 1233 (noting that the New York statutes, in providing for release of the
information on a showing of good cause, “do no more than to take these other rela-
tionships into account”).
81 Id. at 1232 (“[E]ven though appellants are adults we must assume that they are
still part of their adoptive families, families still in existence as to each of them which
might be adversely affected by the release of information as to the names of natural
parents or the unsealing of the adoption records.”).
82 Id.
83 Alma Soc’y, Inc. v. Mellon, 444 U.S. 995 (1979).
84 In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751, 754 (Ill. 1981) (“Although information regard-
ing one’s background, heritage, and heredity is important to one’s identity, it does
not fall within any heretofore delineated zone of privacy implicitly protected within
the Bill of Rights.”).
85 See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).
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rights of a child whenever it might serve a child’s best interest.86
The Court held that the statute violated the Due Process Clause
because it gave no weight to a “parent’s estimation of the child’s
best interest”87 and instead favored grandparent visitation at the
expense of the parent’s fundamental right. While Troxel presented
the separate issue of grandparent visitation, the Court is equally
likely to view a right to access donor-identifying information as in-
fringing upon a parent’s fundamental right to make decisions for
his or her child by ignoring the parent’s estimation of what is in
the child’s best interest.
Constitutional jurisprudence regarding state action, standing,
and substantive due process presents serious constitutional hurdles
for those seeking information about their donor’s identity. There-
fore, donor-conceived individuals should use the media to influ-
ence state legislatures to enact legislation regarding sperm donor
anonymity policies. Such legislation could effectively balance a
child’s right to know with a donor’s expectation of privacy without
involving the courts.
III. CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL RECOGNITION OF DONOR-
CONCEIVED CHILDREN’S “RIGHT TO KNOW”
While constitutional claims in the U.S. will likely fail to ad-
vance the interests of individuals who oppose anonymous dona-
tion, Canadian constitutional law might be more amenable to their
arguments. In 2011 the Supreme Court of British Columbia, the
province’s superior trial court,88 briefly held that anonymous dona-
tion policies violated the rights of donor-conceived children. While
the Court of Appeal of British Columbia—the province’s highest
court—later overturned that decision, this section highlights how
constitutional arguments have been tailored to advance the rights
of donor-conceived children living outside of the United States.
Olivia Pratten, a citizen of British Columbia conceived
through artificial insemination, sought access to records regarding
her donor’s identifying information from the doctor who had per-
formed the insemination on her mother.89 Pratten learned that
86 Id. at 57.
87 Id.
88 Supreme Court, COURTS OF B.C., http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/supreme_court/
[https://perma.cc/KLQ9-YAW4].
89 Pratten v. British Columbia (Att’y Gen.), 2011 BCSC 656, para. 1-2 (Can. B.C.),
rev’d in part Pratten v. British Columbia (Att’y Gen.), 2012 BCCA 480 (Can. B.C.),
http://www.cbc.ca/bc/news/bc-110519-pratten-sperm-donor-ruling.pdf [https://
perma.cc/EP54-5MJB].
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records related to her conception were destroyed pursuant to the
rules of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Colum-
bia, which authorized sperm banks to destroy records pertaining to
artificial insemination six years after the last recorded entry.90 Prat-
ten brought a constitutional suit against the College of Physicians
and Surgeons seeking to enjoin the record destruction policy.91 On
appeal to the Supreme Court of British Columbia, Pratten argued
that permitting adopted children to trace their genetic heritage
under existing provincial legislation,92 while prohibiting donor-
conceived children like her from accessing such information, vio-
lated her equal protection rights under section 15 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms,93 and her liberty and self-security
rights under section 7 of the Charter.94
Justice Adair, writing for the court, agreed with Pratten.95 Jus-
tice Adair recognized that “donor offspring experience sadness,
frustration, depression and anxiety—in other words, they suffer
psychological and psychosocial difficulties—when they are unable
to obtain information. They feel the effects both for themselves
and, when they become parents, for their own children.”96 Justice
Adair ultimately concluded that by treating adopted children and
donor-conceived children differently, the manner of their concep-
tion “gave rise to a difference in treatment that in turn caused so-
cial disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice or stereotyping,” in
violation of section 15 of the Charter.97 Justice Adair articulated
the law as making a classification between adopted individuals and
donor-conceived individuals, noting that while parents have an im-
portant interest in decision-making regarding the level of detail
given to their donor-conceived children,98 donor offspring are par-
90 Id. at para. 2.
91 Id. at para. 4.
92 Id. at para. 3 (describing provincial legislation of British Columbia that man-
dates strict record-keeping guidelines regarding information about the biological ori-
gins and family history of adopted individuals).
93 See Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B, Pt. I, s. 15 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C.
1985, app II, no 44 (Can.) (“Every individual is equal before and under the law and
has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimina-
tion and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic ori-
gin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.”).
94 Pratten, 2011 BCSC 656, at para. 7.
95 Id. at para. 111.
96 Id.
97 See id. at para. 240-58; id. at para. 268 (“I conclude further that excluding donor
offspring from the benefits and protections of the Adoption Act and Adoption Regulation
creates a distinction between adoptees and donor offspring, and that distinction is
based on . . . manner of conception.”).
98 Id. at para. 111(h).
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ticularly vulnerable because they do not have “the benefit of the
kind of . . . legislative support provided to and for adoptees in
B.C.”99 The decision effectively favors a child’s interests in donor
information over parental authority to control the child’s upbring-
ing and the sperm donor’s right to reproductive privacy. This case
highlights a growing movement outside of the United States that
favors the rights of donor-conceived children over the privacy in-
terests of the donor.
Pratten’s victory was short-lived. In 2012, the Attorney General
appealed the decision to the British Columbia Court of Appeal,
which overturned the lower court’s decision and held that the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms “does not guarantee a positive
right to know one’s past.”100 The Court of Appeal implied that
adoptees experience far greater negative effects from being unable
to know information about their genetic heritage than do donor-
conceived children. The Court relied on this theory when writing,
“it is open to the Legislature to provide adoptees with the means of
accessing information about their biological origins without being
obligated to provide comparable benefits to other persons seeking
such information.”101
Despite being overturned by the Court of Appeal, the decision
of the Supreme Court of British Columbia reveals how equal pro-
tection jurisprudence can be used to advance the interests of do-
nor-conceived children outside of the United States. Similar equal
protection arguments likely would fail in the United States, how-
ever, because donor-conceived children likely would not be consid-
ered a suspect class under Carolene Products’ footnote four.102 Thus,
U.S. courts would likely apply rational basis scrutiny to policies de-
nying donor-conceived children access to their donor’s records.
Under rational basis scrutiny, courts defer to the legislature’s pur-
pose in enacting such policies, requiring only a legitimate state in-
terest and means rationally related to effectuate such interest.103
Under rational basis scrutiny, such policies would be upheld under
the U.S. Constitution.
99 Id. at para. 111(i).
100 Pratten v. British Columbia (Att’y Gen.), 2012 BCCA 480, para. 7 (Can. B.C.)
(internal quotation marks omitted), http://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcca/doc/2012/
2012bcca480/2012bcca480.pdf [https://perma.cc/PEA4-ZQQR].
101 Id.
102 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (introduc-
ing the concept that discrimination against discrete and insular minorities warrants
heightened judicial scrutiny).
103 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
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IV. WASHINGTON STATE’S APPROACH TO SPERM DONATION: A
SUCCESSFUL BALANCE OF ANONYMITY AND PRIVACY
While anonymous donation policies promote crucial pecuni-
ary, family unity, and privacy interests, donor-conceived children
should be afforded access to some information about their genetic
heritage upon their eighteenth birthday. The United States’ sperm
donation industry should model its policies after Washington
State’s newly enacted insemination law, which safeguards the rights
of donor-conceived children while protecting a donor’s choice to
keep his information private. In this section, I argue that Washing-
ton’s model effectively balances the rights of the donor-conceived
individual with that of the donor, and therefore should serve as a
prototype for donation policy across the United States.
In 2011, the Washington State legislature passed a law requir-
ing full disclosure of donor-identifying information and medical
history upon the child’s eighteenth birthday.104 Under this legisla-
tion, however, the donor can choose to keep his identifying infor-
mation private by signing an affidavit of nondisclosure at the time
of donation.105 Even if the donor signs the nondisclosure affidavit,
the child is entitled to receive information regarding the donor’s
medical history upon his or her eighteenth birthday.106
Unlike the majority approach to artificial insemination, which
presumes a right to anonymity unless the donor expressly consents
to a release of his information, Washington’s model presumes a
right to donor-identifying information unless the donor affirma-
104 The statute reads in its entirety:
(1) A person who donates gametes to a fertility clinic in Washing-
ton to be used in assisted reproduction shall provide, at a minimum, his
or her identifying information and medical history to the fertility clinic.
The fertility clinic shall keep the identifying information and shall dis-
close the information as provided under subsection (2) of this section.
(2)(a) A child conceived through assisted reproduction who is at
least eighteen years old shall be provided, upon his or her request, ac-
cess to identifying information of the donor who provided the gametes
for the assisted reproduction . . . , unless the donor has signed an affida-
vit of nondisclosure with the fertility clinic that provided the gamete for
assisted reproduction.
(b) Regardless of whether the donor signed an affidavit of nondis-
closure, a child conceived through assisted reproduction who is at least
eighteen years old shall be provided, upon his or her request, access to
non-identifying medical history of the donor who provided gametes for
the assisted reproduction that resulted in the birth of the child.
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.750 (2016).
105 Id. § 26.26.750(2)(a).
106 Id. § 26.26.750(2)(b).
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tively withholds such information by signing the nondisclosure affi-
davit. By reversing the standard presumption, Washington’s
donation statute protects the rights of donor-conceived children
prior to their conception. This is especially appropriate because it
occurs at a time when the child cannot make his or her own deci-
sions regarding a right to donor-identifying information. In addi-
tion, Washington’s donation statute balances the right of the
donor by allowing the donor to assert his privacy interests at the
time of the donation. This model recognizes the virtues of anonym-
ity by allowing the donor to make a decision about the release of
his information, while permitting the child to obtain donor-identi-
fying information (or at least medical history) upon his or her
eighteenth birthday. Under this model, if a donor fails to sign the
nondisclosure affidavit, he implies consent to a release of his infor-
mation and thus permits access to basic identifying information
without infringing upon his privacy rights.
Washington’s statute admirably attempts to balance donors’
rights with their offspring’s interest in obtaining information about
genetic heritage. However, the model continues to give donors
complete decision-making power at the time of donation by afford-
ing them the right to sign a nondisclosure affidavit, thereby sub-
jecting their offspring to a decision made before the date of their
conception. While donor-conceived children are always afforded
access to medical history information under this approach, it con-
tinues to subordinate the wishes of the child to that of the sperm
donor. Nevertheless, the Washington model propels the industry
in the right direction by presuming open donation and placing a
hurdle—albeit a small one—in front of the donor if he wishes to
maintain anonymity. Even if Washington’s approach is more sym-
bolic in nature than meaningful nationwide, it should be heralded
as a step forward in the attempt to balance donor control and pri-
vacy with the legitimate identity interests of donor-conceived
individuals.
V. CONCLUSION
In June of 2010, when I was 22 years old, I contacted the
sperm bank that provided the gamete to my mothers and read my
five-digit identifying number to an employee on the receiver. She
put me on hold for approximately two minutes and then noncha-
lantly told me that my number matched that of a 16-year-old girl
living in New York City—a half-sibling living in the same city as me.
My first thought was how strange it felt to call this person my “half-
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sister.” To me, she was just another person who shared my genetic
heritage.
I decided to call the sperm bank again five years later in 2015
to verify the accuracy of that information in preparation for this
article. I spoke to a doctor at the facility who told me that his
records indicated the existence of one girl born from the particu-
lar gamete in 1989. I realized that he was describing me, although
his records had an incorrect date of birth (I was born in 1988). I
corrected my date of birth, and I asked him about a half-sister. He
informed me that his records did not reflect her existence. When I
relayed the information I had received five years prior, he told me
that the company had moved facilities and reiterated the difficulty
of maintaining accurate information about half-siblings due to lax
reporting requirements. He also suggested that I check the Donor
Sibling Registry because it was “entirely possible that another per-
son was born from that same gamete.”
Hearing that the sperm bank’s records did not reflect the exis-
tence of a half-sibling after all—or at least could not conclusively
establish her existence—highlighted the unfortunate role that ano-
nymity plays in perpetuating a system of lax record-keeping prac-
tices. The doctor’s unconcerned tone of voice in relaying this
information also reflected how anonymity decreases the impor-
tance of genetics in one’s perception of family. Most importantly,
hearing this information made me realize that the people who
raised me, including the family friends with whom I had shared
Thanksgiving and Christmas for over twenty years, are the people
who have contributed to my identity. This realization helped to
temper the sadness and confusion I felt upon learning that I may
not have a biological half-sister.
While a sperm donation model premised on anonymity cer-
tainly does have pitfalls, the benefits of this model still outweigh
the negatives. Anonymity must be preserved as an option to protect
non-traditional family structures and the relationships formed
within them. States should consider creating sperm donation laws
modeled on Washington State’s insemination statute, which bal-
ances a child’s request for basic identifying information with a do-
nor’s fundamental right to privacy. The model should presume a
right to donor-identifying information upon a child’s eighteenth
birthday, yet should seal donor-identifying information if the do-
nor expressly forbade such disclosure at the time of donation. In-
formation related to medical history and genetic disposition
should never be sealed from donor-conceived children.
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Sperm donation, and the anonymity that cloaks many donors,
has afforded me the opportunity to be born into a non-traditional
family. It has also helped to develop my own sense of self by al-
lowing me to choose my identity without the guidelines often im-
posed by genetics. Most importantly, it has taught me that I can
choose to create a family with whomever I love.
